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Do Polluters Truly Pay? A Chip in the "Potentially Responsible
Parties" Analysis for Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Celanese Corporationv. Martin K. Eby ConstructionCompany, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. U.S., 2 and introduced an
element of intent into what had traditionally been a strict liability
provision for allocating responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste.3
The Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to follow this new precedent
explicitly in the case presented here, Celanese v. Eby. Despite unanimous
agreement that the defendant was the proximate cause of the harm, the
court was forced to find the defendant not liable for this harm due to a lack
of intent. This note analyzes the history of hazardous waste liability for
potentially responsible persons and determines whether the Supreme
Court's new precedent has created a loophole for responsible parties to
escape liability. Furthermore, potential solutions are presented for
analysis and to determine if this is a problem in need of further attention.

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The plaintiff-appellant, Celanese Corporation ("Celanese") is a
global leader in the chemicals industry headquartered in the state of
Texas.4 It owns and operates an underground pipeline transporting the
chemical methanol between its plants in Harris County, Texas.5 In 1979,
the Coastal Water Authority of Texas ("CWA") contracted with

' 620 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2010).
S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
' Id. at 1879-80.
4 Celanese Corp., Company Profile,http://www.celanese.com/index/about-index/
company-profile.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
Celanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth. ("Coastal Water"), 2009 WL 981717, *1 (S.D.
Tex. 2009).
2 129
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defendant-appellee Martin K. Eby Construction Company ("Eby") to
install an underground water pipeline to supply industrial plants in Harris
County with water. 6 This pipeline had to cross many other underground
pipelines, including the pipeline owned by Celanese.7 In order to install a
new pipeline amidst this maze of other lines, Eby first excavated an area to
uncover other pipelines, and then ran its pipeline underneath all existing
pipelines. After installing each segment, Eby would then "backfill" the
area and move on to the next segment.9
During this installation procedure, an Eby employee struck and
damaged the Celanese pipeline with a backhoe.' 0 The damaged portion
was neither exposed nor in plain view prior to the backfilling procedure."
Thus, the employee did not know what he had struckl 2 and there was no
report filed with Eby or any of the other companies involved in the
construction.13 No one at Eby knew that their work on the CWA pipeline
had caused damage to the Celanese pipeline.14
Over the years, this dented pipe deteriorated due to stress corrosion
cracking. 15 This led to a crack penetrating the wall of the pipe,
subsequently allowing methanol to leak from the pipe.' 6 The leak was not
discovered until October 1, 2002, at which point Celanese fixed the pipe
and worked to clean up the site and prevent any contamination of nearby

6
7

Celanese Corp. v. Eby ("Celanese"), 620 F.3d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id.

8id.

9Id.
10Id.

1 Coastal Water, 2009 WL 981717, at *2.
12 Evidence was given at trial as to whether an average employee would
be able to tell the
difference between striking a heavy rock or striking metal. This evidence was
inconclusive. Id. at *2-*3.
13 Celanese, 620 F.3d at
530.
14 Id.
15 Id. Stress corrosion cracking is a term used to describe a slow mechanical
failure in the
form of a crack that results from the combined influence of mechanical stress and a
corrosive environment. See RUSSELL H. JONES, STRESS-CORROSION CRACKING,
MATERIALS PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 1 (ASM Int'l, 1992).
16

Celanese, 620 F.3d at 530.
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groundwater.17 At least 232,000 gallons of methanol have been removed
from the subsurface at the site but it is unknown exactly how much
methanol was released over the years.' 8
Celanese sued Eby under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")' 9 and the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA") 20 in order to recover cleanup costs
by claiming that Eby was liable as an "arranger" under both acts. 2 '
Whether Eby was liable hinged on the statutory definition of an arranger
for both acts.22
The parties tried the case in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, using a jury as the finder of fact on the SWDA
issues and the judge as the finder of fact regarding the CERCLA claims. 23
Both the judge and the jury24 found that "[t]he release at the Site would
not have occurred but for the 1979 damage to the Celanese methanol
line." 25 However, the trial court held that Eby was not liable as an
arranger under either statute because Eby had no knowledge that it had
damaged the Celanese pipeline.2 6 As a result, the trial court declined to
make any further findings or conclusions regarding damages for
Celanese's claims. 27
Celanese filed a motion to amend or alter the judgment, which the
district court denied. 28 Subsequently, Celanese appealed this final
judgment contending, "the common law of negligence, industry custom

17

Id.

Id. at 531.
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006).
Tex. Health & Safety Code § 361.344 (2010).
21Celanese, 620 F.3d at 531.
22
id.
20

23

42

Id at 530.

24 Under the Texas statute, a party has the right to have a jury act as the fact finder. In a

CERCLA case, however, a jury's findings can only be advisory. See R.R. Street & Co.
Inc. v. Pilgrim Enter., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Tex. 2005).
25 Celanese, 620 F.3d at 531.
26

id

27 Id. Texas courts refer to this as a "take nothing judgment" because the plaintiff walks
2away
8

id

with nothing.
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and practice, and Eby's contract with the CWA 'imposed on Eby the
obligation to investigate what it hit in a pipeline corridor and rectify any
damage."' 29 Celanese argued that by failing to investigate the incident,
Eby consciously disregarded this obligation and should be held liable
under CERCLA and SWDA.3 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reviewed
this question of arranger liability de novo as the only question was
whether the district court erred as a matter of law.3 ' As an initial matter,
the court made it clear that Celanese could not raise a new legal argument
that it had not argued before the trial court. 32 Therefore, Celanese
unintentionally waived its "conscious-disregard" argument by failing to
argue it at trial.33 In addition, the court determined that even if the
argument had not been waived, Eby would still remain free from liability
as an arranger under both statutes because "it did not plan or take any
intentional steps to release methanol from the Celanese pipeline." 34
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. 35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. History andPurposeof CERCLA
In the wake of large-scale and highly publicized environmental
disasters, 36 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental

29
30
31

d
id.
Celanese, 620 F.3d at 531.

32

d

33

id.

34 d.

" Id. at 534.
3 See "Love Canal" disaster in Niagara Falls, New York where chemicals seeped in the
ground from abandoned hazardous waste sites and coincided with a high incidence of
health problems in the area. The residents of Love Canal tried to force those responsible
to cleanup the sites and to provide damages for the injuries caused, but they were unable
to do so. President Carter had to declare a state of emergency in the neighborhood, and
the EPA commissioned a study to determine how many other waste sites might exist in
the U.S. This study led to the proposal and passage of CERCLA. Elizabeth A. Glass,
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Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").37 The purpose
of this statute is to facilitate immediate identification and cleanup of
hazardous waste sites, to properly allocate these cleanup costs to those
responsible for the problems, and to deter and prevent pollution in
general.
Under § 9607 of CERCLA, the statute imposes joint and
several strict liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs on defined
"potentially responsible parties" ("PRPs"). 39 There are four categories of
PRPs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response cost. 4 0

The Modern Snake in the Grass:An Examination ofReal Estate and Commercial
Liability under Superfund and SARA and Suggested Guidelinesfor the Practitioner,14
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1987).
Richard M. Weinstein & Sally A. Aiello, Bringinga Cost Recovery Action Under
CERCLA §107,2-17 ToxIC TORTS GUIDE § 17.13(1) (2011).
38
Id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986), U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1Ith Cir. 1990)).
39Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009).
40 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
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This statutory language boils down to assigning strict liability for the cost
of hazardous waste cleanup to anyone who currently owns or operates the
vessel/facility, who owned it at the time of the spill, who arranged for the
disposal of the waste, or who accepted the waste for transport. The statute
creates a right for the government to sue a private entity falling within the
above categories, and has been construed to create a cause of action
allowing a private party to recover the costs of cleaning up hazardous
wastes from other responsible parties.41
In order to recover costs under CERCLA, the plaintiff must prove
the following factors.4 2 First, the site of the hazardous waste must be a
facility as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 960 l(9).43 Second, there must have been
a release or a threatened release of a hazardous substance at the site as
stated in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)." Third, this release or threatened release
must have created response costs in cleaning up or preventing a spill. 45
Finally, the plaintiff must show the defendant is a "covered person" or
responsible party under one of the four categories explained above.4 6 The
statute has been interpreted to impose strict liability for cleanup costs. 47
Accordingly, the plaintiff need not show the defendant actually caused
harm to the environment, but merely that costs were incurred and the
defendant is one of the statutorily defined "potentially responsible
parties."48 While there are defenses to liability provided by the statute,
these defenses are limited to: "an act of God, an act of war," or an act or

2-17 Toxic TORTS GUIDE § 17.13(1); see U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp 802,
805 (S.D. Ohio, 1983) (interpreting the statute's language of "shall be liable" to signify a
strict liability standard).
42 2-17 Toxic TORTS GUIDE § 17.13(2)(a).
43 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2006). The statute defines facility to include any iteration of a
building or structure, or any area where hazardous substances have "come to be located."
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). "Release" includes spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, etc.
45 2-17 Toxic TORTS GUIDE § 17.13(2)(a). See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53
F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Under CERCLA, if a responsible party .. . releases
hazardous materials into the environment, and that release 'causes the incurrence of
response costs,' then the party is liable." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 96-7(a) (2006)).
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
47
See Toxic TORTS GUIDE, supra,note 41.
48 2-17 Toxic TORTS GUIDE § 17.13(3).
41
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omission of a party other than the defendant whose act or omission does
not relate to a contractual relationship with the defendant.4 9
B. Defining "Arranger"
CERCLA § 9607(a)(3) imposes strict liability on "any person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment" of
hazardous substances.5 0 However, nowhere in the statute is the term
"arranged" defined. Thus, it has been left to the courts to fashion this
category and determine when an entity is liable for costs as an arranger.
In interpreting this statute, courts have deduced two different types
of arranger liability: a "traditional" arranger and a "broader category" of
arranger culpability. Under the direct or traditional notion of arranger
liability, a party becomes a PRP if they were to "enter into a transaction
for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous
substance."
However, the courts have determined that where the
transaction is merely a sale of an item from one party to another, arranger
liability does not attach. 3
1. "Broad" Category of Arranger Liability: U.S. v. Aceto
For many years, the standard for arranger liability was found in the
case of United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.5 4 In Aceto,
the government sought to recover costs from cleaning up a pesticide

4942
U.S.C.
50

§ 9607(b).
1d. § 9607(a)(3).
5 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948 (9th Cir. 2007)
("Accordingly, we have recognized, in addition to 'direct' arranger liability, a 'broader'
category of arranger liability . .. in which disposal of hazardous wastes is a foreseeable
byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to PRP status.").
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009).
5 See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,
893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.
1990) ("If a party merely sells a product, without additional evidence that the transaction
includes an 'arrangement' for the ultimate disposal of a hazardous substance, CERCLA
liability would not be imposed.").
4 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1988).
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formulation facility operated by the Aidex Corporation. " Hazardous
waste had leaked from deteriorating containers into the surface soil and
groundwater.5 6 The EPA wanted to recover costs not only from Aidex
(who was liable as an "owner" under CERCLA), but from the eight
pesticide manufacturers who did business with Aidex. 57 The EPA argued
that six of the eight manufactures were liable as arrangers due to their
relationship with Aidex. 58 Aidex used technical grade pesticide 59
ingredients supplied from the manufactures and formulated it to create
commercial grade product. 60 The crux of the EPA's argument was that the
generation of the hazardous waste was inherent in the process of forming
the pesticides. 6 1 Because of this, Aidex could not have mixed the
manufacturers' pesticides without disposing of a portion of them. 62
Additionally, the EPA argued that because the defendant manufactures
owned the technical grade pesticide, the work in process, and the
commercial grade product, they also had control over Aidex's
operations. 63 Thus, by contracting with Aidex, the manufacturers also
"arranged for" the disposal of the waste. 64 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
notion that control over disposal is required to show "arranger" status65
and determined that a broad reading of CERCLA was consistent with the
goals of the statute and its "polluter pays" principle. 66 Authority to control

ssId. at 1375.
s6 Id.
5

7 id.

s8 Id. at 1376.
s9 Pesticide manufacturers create a "technical grade pesticide" that must be mixed with
other substances in order to create a "commercial grade pesticide" that can then be sold to
the public. The pesticide manufactures provide "active" ingredients to a "formulator"
like Aidex who then mixes the technical grade pesticide with specific materials to create
the commercial grade pesticide. During this process, the mixture is referred to as the
"work in process." Id. at 1375.
60 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375
(8th Cir. 1989).
61Id. at 1375-76.
62
Id. at 1379.
SId.
64id.
6s Id. at

1382.
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989).

66
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the disposal process is a much bigger factor when it can be shown that the
company does not actually own the hazardous substance. 67 Because the
manufacturers were owners of the substance, the control argument failed.
Thus, the facts alleged by the EPA were sufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss for failing to state a claim.6 8
Following this case, numerous other circuits continued to refine
and detail the definition of "arranger" liability.
2. Application of Aceto to Other Cases
In the 1992 case of General Electric v. AAMCO Transmissions,
Inc.,69 General Electric ("G.E.") attempted to hold various oil companies
liable for cleanup costs due to the fact that these companies sold oil to the
filing stations that directly arranged for the disposal of waste oil to the
affected site. 70 G.E. argued that due to the broad purpose of CERCLA,
any party who had "the ability or authority to direct or control the disposal
of hazardous wastes, even though they never participated in the actual
decision of how or where to dispose of them" should be liable as an
arranger. The Second Circuit agreed that arranger liability can attach to
parties who do not exhibit active involvement "regarding the timing,
manner or location of disposal."7 However, for liability to attach, there
must be some "nexus" between the alleged responsible party and the
actual disposal. This nexus is based on traditional notions of duty and

7

Id. at 1383.
"Id. at 1382.
69 962 F.2d 281 (2d
Cir. 1992).
70
d. at 282. Between 1975 and 1980, defendant Wray transported various
hazardous
waste from G.E.'s facilities to a storage site. The waste leaked into the groundwater at
the site. G.E. settled the suit and agreed to fund the cleanup, but retained the right to
pursue a subsequent contribution action against other potential defendants. Subsequently,
G.E. filed suit against individual service stations that had arranged for the disposal or
transport of waste oil at the storage site and also added the oil companies such as Shell
based on the fact that they leased the service station facilities and sold the oil to the
service station defendants. Id. at 282-83.
71
d. at 284.
72
Id. at 286.
1

73 id.

578

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3
obligation.74 Thus, arranger liability may fall on a party who has the
"obligation to exercise control over hazardous waste disposal," but not a
party who has the "mere ability or opportunity to control."7 5 Because the
oil companies had no obligation to exercise control over how the filing
stations disposed of the waste oil, these companies were not liable under
CERCLA as an arranger. 76
From the late 1980s until 2009, most courts engaged in a factintensive inquiry to determine whether a party could be deemed an
arranger and be liable for costs under CERCLA. Factors influencing this
process were: whether the party owned or possessed the hazardous
substance at issue at any point in the process;7 8 whether a party had
knowledge that the substance would or could be released; 79 or whether a
party had exercised control over the process by which the release occurred
or had some type of involvement in the disposal or decision to dispose of
the hazardous substance.80 Eventually, this notion of arranger status was
clarified and narrowed by the United States Supreme Court.

74

d

7s General
76

Elec. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2nd Cir. 1992).

Id. at 287-88.

See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.
1990) ("Whether an 'arrangement for' disposal exists depends on the facts of each
case."), United States v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 337, 340 (N.D. W.V. 1997)
("the Court believes that the statutory language and purposes of CERCLA require
adoption of the 'totality of the circumstances' approach ... Each case in which
'arrangement for disposal' is to be construed must be decided by reviewing the totality of
the circumstances, on a case-by-case basis.").
78 See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., Inc., 990 F.Supp. 1473, 1479
(M.D. Ga. 1998) ("Generally speaking, to be found liable as an arranger a party must
have either been in actual or constructive ownership or possession of the hazardous
wastes.").
7 See GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2004) (While parties
require some intent to make preparations for the disposal of hazardous wasted, "that
intent goes to the matter of disposing waste generally, not to disposing of it in a particular
manner or at a particular location.").
80 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F.Supp. 707, 724 (S.D. Ga. 1993)
(Arranger liability may be established "by showing actual involvement in the decision to
dispose or by showing an obligation to control the hazardous substance.").
7
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3. Burlington Northern and its Effects on Arranger Liability
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided the case of Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe RR Co v. US, 8 1 which looked to clarify the
definition of arranger liability. 82 Brown & Bryant ("B&B"), an
agricultural chemical distribution company, purchased pesticides and other
chemicals from many suppliers, including Shell Oil Company.8 3 One of
the main pesticides B&B bought from Shell was the pesticide D-D.8 4
When B&B would order this pesticide, "Shell would arrange for delivery
by common carrier."85 During the delivery and transfer process, leaks and
spills of this pesticide often occurred.8 6 When Shell became aware of
these spills, it tried to take action to cut down and prevent them. 87
Additionally, both B&B and the "common carrier" would try to catch the
spills and prevent the pesticide from going into the ground. Eventually,
the Department of Toxic Substances Control investigated B&B 89 and the
EPA had to step in and undertake cleanup efforts at the site. 90
The EPA subsequently sued Shell, claiming that Shell was an
arranger under CERCLA and should be liable for a portion of the cleanup

129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
Id. at 1877-78. Burlington Northernnot only addressed
the scope of arranger liability,
but also set new precedent for the proper way to apportion cleanup costs among multiple
defendants. Id.
8 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009).
84
Id. at 1875.
85
Id.
81

82

86id

Id. ("Shell . .. provided detailed safety manuals, . . . instituted a voluntary
discount
program for distributors that made improvements in their" handling [of the hazardous
materials and] "required distributors" to have a "qualified engineer" inspect the facilities
and show "compliance with applicable laws and regulations.").
8 Id. (They used "buckets to catch spills from hoses and gaskets
connecting the tanker
trucks to its bulk storage tank." However, these buckets were sometimes knocked over or
overflowed.).
8 CAL. DEP'T OF ToxIc SUBSTANCE CONTROL,
DTSC: Who We Are and What We Do,
http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/InformationResources/DTSCOverview.cfm (2007) (The
Department of Toxic Substances Control ("DTSC") is a California agency designed to
protect the state and its citizens from exposures to hazardous wastes).
oBurlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1876 (2009).
87
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costs. 9 ' The Ninth Circuit found that while Shell was not a "traditional"
arranger because it had not directly contracted to dispose of hazardous
material, Shell could still be liable under a "broader category of arranger
liability if the disposal of hazardous wastes was a foreseeable byproduct
of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to arranger
liability." 92 Because CERCLA defined "disposal" to include "leaking"
and "spilling," the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that intention to
dispose was not required in order for an entity to be found to have
"arranged for disposal."9 3
In an 8-to-i decision, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth
Circuit. 94 Looking to Merriam-Webster's Dictionary for guidance, the
Court determined the word "arrange" implied action directed to a specific
purpose. 95 Consequently, to qualify as an "arranger" under CERCLA, an
entity must take intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance. 96
The Court further concluded that "knowledge alone is insufficient to prove
that an entity 'planned for' the disposal."9 7 In order for Shell to qualify as
an arranger, the Court stated that at the outset of the transaction for D-D,
Shell must have intended that at least a portion of D-D would be disposed
of during the transfer to B&B.9 8 Because the facts did not support this
version of events, the Court found that Shell was not liable as an arranger
and thus not required to help with the cleanup costs. 99
Due to this Supreme Court decision, arranger liability no longer
attaches based upon mere knowledge, control, and possession, but instead
requires a more specific showing of actual intent to dispose of hazardous
material.

91
92 Id

Id at 1877 (internal quotations omitted).

93 id

94 Id. at 1883-84.
95
Id
96

at 1879 (citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 64 (10th ed. 1993)).
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879 (2009).
97
Id at 1880.
98
id
99 Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge Elrod for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the issue
in this case to be whether Eby is liable as an "arranger" under the
CERCLA statutes and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act.' 00 The court
reviewed this case de novo as the law regarding arranger liability status
was the only question.' 0 ' At the outset of its discussion, the court found
Celanese was attempting to make an argument on appeal that it had not
raised at the trial court level.10 2 The court stated that per the general rules
of the court, an argument not raised at the district court level are thus
waived and will not be considered on appeal. 03 Since Celanese had
argued at trial that Eby had actually known and covered up the damage to
the pipe, instead of its new conscious disregard theory, the court found the
latter argument to have been completely waived.104
Alternatively, the court analyzed the case under this conscious
disregard theory and still found it to be lacking in plausibility.0 s For
starters, the court gave a brief history of the CERCLA statute and how it
imposes strict liability for environmental contamination for parties that fall
within one of the four categories.1os Because "arrange" is not defined in
the statute, the court next looked to the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of
Burlingon N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co v. United States.' In Burlington, the
Court addressed the meaning of "to arrange for disposal" and when a party
is liable for cleanup costs as an arranger. 08 The Burlington Court held
that the plain language of "arrange" implies action directed to a specific
purpose and thus, to be an arranger, a party must have taken intentional
steps or planned for the disposal of a hazardous substance to be liable.10 9

100 Celanese v. Eby, 620 F.3d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 2010).
1o1Id. at
10 2 Id.

531 (citing Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2001)).

Id.
104id

s Id. at 532.

106 Celanese v. Eby, 620 F.3d 529, 532
(5th Cir. 2010).
107

129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).

108 Celanese, 620 F.3d
at 532.

'o9Id. at 533.
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Applying this rule to the facts of this case, the Fifth Circuit found
the record did not support the finding that Eby took intentional steps or
planned to release methanol from the Celanese pipeline."l 0 Celanese's
argument that consciously disregarding a duty to investigate was
"tantamount" to an intentional act was completely rejected by the court,
which held that negligence does not equal intention."' Furthermore, the
court believed the defendant Shell Oil Company in Burlington had a more
culpable mens rea,112 yet despite this, the Supreme Court there still found
no arranger liability. The court reasoned, "[g]iven that there was no
arranger liability under those circumstances, we fail to see how we can
impose such liability here when Eby did not even know that it had struck
the Celanese pipeline." 1 3
After deciding that Eby was not liable as an arranger under
CERCLA, the court analyzed whether Eby was liable under the Texas
SWDA statute.114 Because the Texas Supreme Court had not considered
SWDA liability in light of the new Burlington changes, the Fifth Circuit
had to determine how the Texas Supreme Court might now interpret
arranger liability.' 1 5 The Fifth Circuit found detailed instructions in Texas
Supreme Court precedent that federal case law be the guide for
interpretation of the term "otherwise arranged."' 1 6 Thus; the Fifth Circuit
felt comfortable in predicting the Texas Supreme Court would apply
Burlington to these facts and under the same reasoning applied to the
CERCLA claim, Eby would also not be liable as an arranger under the

t1l Id.
2

..Id. Shell Oil had actual knowledge that the transportation of the hazardous waste was
resulting in some spillage. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1870, 1875 (2009).
113 Celanese v. Eby, 620 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2010).
114
d

1atId.
"16Id. at 534.
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SWDA." 7 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment
that Eby was not liable as an arranger under either statute. 11 8
V. COMMENT
A glaring issue with CERCLA is the mounting tension between its
language and purpose. On one hand, the Supreme Court has logically and
clearly interpreted the category of potentially responsible parties.1' On its
face, equating "to arrange for disposal" with "taking intentional steps to
dispose of' does not seem like an unfair interpretation. However, the
other hand shows a very clear purpose and intent within the CERCLA
statute to transfer the burden of paying for hazardous cleanup costs from
the government and taxpayers to the parties responsible for creating and
causing the harm. While this tension is not always apparent in the
majority of CERCLA cases, the fact pattern detailed in Celanese brings it
to light.
As explained above, both the judge and the jury agreed that the
Eby corporation was the "but for" cause of the damage to the pipe and
subsequent leak of methanol which required many millions of dollars of
cleanup.120 Yet in determining whether Eby should be forced to contribute
to the cleanup costs, the clearly defined statutory categories assigned no
liability. An oft repeated purpose of CERCLA and other cleanup statutes
is to ensure the polluter pays. Unfortunately, some polluters are allowed
to slip through the cracks.
In the majority of CERCLA cases, the responsible polluters fit
neatly into the predetermined categories of PRPs and can be held liable
without any problem. However, while the Celanese case presents a
slightly novel scenario, it is still situation that may arise again and this
should be reflected in the law. One solution to this problem would be to
amend CERCLA to create a fifth category of PRP to include those who
had some type of duty or obligation with respect to the hazardous material.

"7 d.
118 Id.

'9 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879-80 (2009).
Celanese v. Eby, 620 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Another solution would be to merely include a negligence section within a
separate section of CERCLA, distinct from the PRP categories. Yet a
third option for plaintiffs seeking remedies from contributors would be to
use state common law claims such as negligence.
With respect to the first solution, amending the statute to create an
entire new category of PRPs would be the most radical of moves. After
almost thirty years' worth of understanding and interpretation, creating a
new category of responsible parties for hazardous cleanup sites would
upend the environmental world. Industry practices would have to change.
Issues with retroactivity would surface and potentially create a barrage of
litigation over spills already dealt with. Additionally, a key point to the
PRP structure is that "causation" is not necessary. Introducing language
such as "duty" and "obligation" would necessitate a breach of this "duty"
or "obligation;" this in turn introduces an element of causation that must
be proven before a party can be found liable. Requiring causation
completely contravenes CERCLA's incentive to settle disputes quickly
through a less fault-intensive process.
With regard to the second solution mentioned, many of the same
problems would arise as with the first suggestion. Changing a statute that
has been around, been interpreted, and been understood to forego proof of
causation would not be a small amendment. Even if the amendment did
not alter the category of PRPs and instead merely created a "catch-all"
exception, such a change would still completely upend the meaning of
CERCLA as it is presently understood. Regardless of the impact, the
realistic possibility of adding such a big factor into a statute merely to fix a
rare occurrence does not seem likely.
This leaves us with the third suggestion of using state tort
negligence law. In Celanese, Celanese attempted this route but was barred
by the state statute of limitations that had begun to run once the damage to
the pipe was discovered.121 Regardless of whether competent attorneys
would realize the need to file a tort claim, this example still begs the
question of whether state tort law could properly compensate for the
millions of dollars that can be spent when it comes to cleaning up
hazardous waste sites. Many states limit the amount of damages allowable
121 Celanese

Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth., 475 F.Supp.2d 623, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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to the value of the land. For example, if the cleanup costs were going to
be around $1 million, but the value of the land would only be $500,000
after cleanup and a state court could restrict the actual damages to the
value of the land. So even in a case of actual negligence, the responsible
party might not be on the hook for the full cost of that party's actions.
However, this style of damages limitation typically only applies when the
party owning the land desires to sell it. The rationale behind this is that
the courts do not want to allow a landowner to receive a windfall based on
manipulation of the judicial system.
Another issue with using state negligence law is an attorney or
party might not realize this is the proper avenue to take. Because
CERCLA has been around for close to thirty years, many companies who
deal with hazardous waste know and understand CERCLA. Thus if a spill
were to occur, a company could conceivably delay hiring an attorney and
initiating a lawsuit under the mindset that whatever costs incurred in
cleaning up the spill could later be shared once the other responsible
parties are found. In this instance, CERCLA becomes almost a security
blanket. It creates the incentive to clean up now, and apportion liability
later. However, under this notion, one party might believe it has a right to
hold another liable for consciously disregarding a duty not to spill,
proceed to clean up the spill, and then discover that it alone bears the
burden of cleaning costs under CERCLA. In this unlikely hypothetical, it
is possible the statute of limitations for negligence could have passed,
leaving the party who took the initiative to clean responsible for the entire
cleanup cost.
Looking at the options, it is hard to determine where a different
line could be drawn. Introducing the low standard of negligence into the
CERCLA statute could produce a result where a negligent driver crashes
into a gas station and finds himself drawn into federal court and sued for
an exorbitant amount. However, requiring a very specific notion of intent
in order to be held liable as an arranger has effectively excluded parties
who deal with hazardous waste, have a duty not to spill it, yet have no way
for this duty to be enforced using the federal structure. It will be
interesting to see how future courts handle this problem.

586

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 18, No. 3

VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there appears to be a disconnect between the
intention and purpose of CERCLA and the further narrowing of liability
rules by the courts. The judiciary has traditionally defined "arranger"
liability using broad interpretations in order to further the "polluter pays"
principle. With Celanese v. Eby, the Fifth Circuit diligently and
meticulously followed the Supreme Court's new precedent, yet the result
is unsatisfactory. Perhaps a future court will find that contrary to the Fifth
Circuit, intentionally and consciously disregarding a duty to inform of a
spill can in fact be equated with actual intent to disperse. This case should
also present a warning to companies and attorneys to make sure and check
all other options before relying on a federal statute. Hopefully, those truly
responsible for spills and harm to the environment will not be able to
escape liability so easily in the future.
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